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Abstract
In the contemporary issue of same-sex marriage within the United
Methodist Church, the Jerusalem Council’s decision-making process to
include Gentiles in Acts 15 has been appealed to as a model for the church
to redefine and reshape its current interpretation of scripture. This article
demonstrates how the hermeneutical approach of the Jerusalem Council,
which made use of Old Testament understandings of Torah-authority,
especially using Leviticus 17-18, did not aim to redefine or change the
meaning of the Torah, but to use it for guidance and direction. Applying
such a method to the current issue of same-sex marriage would be
incompatible with this hermeneutical decision-making process of the early
Church.
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“To require of Gentile Christians obedience
only to the four commandments which the
Law itself imposes on them is not to set aside
the authority of the Law but to uphold it.”1
The United Methodist Church is deeply divided over samesex practices. Church trials for ministers who have performed same-sex
weddings against the express intent of church discipline and polity threaten
to tear the church apart. Bishop Sally Dyck offered the following comments
last November to members of her annual conference.
In Acts 15, the early church found itself in a conflict over
the law as well as accepted and deeply held assumptions
and traditions about who people are (circumcised or
uncircumcised). It was a visceral reaction by some
against Paul and others who were reaching out to the
(uncircumcised) Gentiles. They stood on the side of
the law but the church found a way to be together that
seemed to work. I don’t think it changed all the hearts
and minds of the Jewish Christians but at least it wasn’t
impeding the outreach to the Gentiles. (Please read the
chapter to see what they did and how they did it.) … I
will be announcing in the near future some evening, open
gatherings where we can discuss how we can reframe this
conversation, based on Acts 15.2
Was the problem addressed by the Jerusalem Council in Acts 15 “a
conflict over the law” as Bishop Dyck suggests? Is the process for decisionmaking in Acts 15 helpful for our current impasse? It has long ago been
questioned whether the analogy with first-century Christians in Acts 15 is
appropriate or pertinent enough to override all other factors in the debate.3
Indeed, the analogy is prima facie dubious because the Jerusalem Council
was considering the nature of salvation itself while the current debate is
over an attempt to redefine Christian sexual ethics. Nevertheless, because
the Council has been used so frequently in recent discourse especially in
the popular media, I turn to a fresh examination of the details of Acts 15
in order to explore its message and possible contributions to the church’s
current debate over same-sex practices. Has it been accurately used in the
debate? If not, what then are the lessons of Acts 15 for today’s debates?
In an article entitled “Welcoming in the Gentiles: A Biblical Model
for Decision Making,” Sylvia C. Keesmaat traces a number of dynamics
involved in making the decision to include the Gentiles in the church.4 She
concludes that “the central importance of hospitality” drives the narrative,
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providing the background for the kinds of new friendships (such as Peter
and Cornelius) making it possible for the Christian leadership in Jerusalem
to hear each other and discern the voice of the Holy Spirit. The result
was a ruling against Pharisaic Christians who argued that circumcision was
required for Gentile believers, even though their argument appeared to
have both scripture and tradition on their side. Keesmaat relies heavily from
time to time on the older work of Luke Timothy Johnson, so my comments
here will occasionally address his arguments as well.5
1. The Bible as Unfinished Drama or Unfinished Authority?
Keesmaat begins by raising the question of the nature of the Bible
and its authority (pages 30-34). Her answer acknowledges diverse genres in
the Bible, but relies on her doctoral supervisor, Professor N. T. Wright, in
asserting that scripture “comes to us overwhelmingly as a narrative” (31).
She emphasizes that the narrative is “an unfinished drama,” and that “we
are in the middle of it.” With Wright, Keesmaat avers that, in order to
live faithfully in the drama, we Christians today need (a) to be faithful to
the story that preceded us and (b) to be creative in our living of the story.
Christian integrity requires both fidelity to and creativity from the biblical
drama. By the latter, Keesmaat means primarily the ability to discern how
the biblical drama unfolds in new cultural situations, and in the light of new
workings of the Holy Spirit. It is precisely this struggle for integrity that
engaged the church at the Jerusalem Council in Acts 15.
Of course, Wright’s “unfinished drama” is widely accepted and
used today, and this is not the place to explore further its implications.6 For
our purposes, it is enough to note here that Keesmaat simplistically equates
the unfinished drama with an unfinished authority. What I mean by this is
that she has assumed a position that Wright himself has critiqued in J. D.
G. Dunn’s approach; that is, as a “cavalier freedom” in the way Christians
approach the text. Dunn argued that Jesus and Paul treated the Old
Testament with a cavalier freedom, and so we are free to do the same with
the New Testament. Wright objected that Dunn’s approach is anachronistic
because we are still living in the unfinished drama of the New Testament
period, whereas Jesus and Paul were living in a different dispensation (for
lack of better word). He objects further that Dunn’s approach is simplistic
because it fails to appreciate fully the foundations upon which Jesus and
Paul reacted as they did to the Old Testament proscriptions, such as
circumcision and food laws.7 I believe Wright’s criticisms of Dunn are
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correct, and should be applied here precisely to Keesmaat’s understanding
of the unfinished drama and unfolding authority of the Bible.
The description of the Bible as an unfinished drama is a useful
metaphor. But the degree to which we emphasize our creativity in
continuing the Bible as an unfinished authority for our day is open for
critique. Clearly, when the church begins to consider itself determinant in
the process, creating a new authority that overturns scripture and tradition,
one can raise an objection that the church has turned the Bible into nothing
more than an historical witness to God’s redemptive activity in the past
rather than an acting and living authority from that past to our present.8
Before moving onto the specifics of Keesmaat’s treatment of Acts
15, I note further an irony in the way she explains how today’s Christians
are to live into the Bible as our story. She turns to Deuteronomy 6:5-9 in a
beautiful description of the role of the story of the Bible in our lives.
[E]very moment of every day is supposed to be filled
with Torah, with the story of who God is and what God
has done. This story fills your very being, so that you
cannot help talking about it to your children at home and
to everyone you meet, no matter where you are. When
you are awake, you tell the story; when you are asleep, you
even dream in its symbols and metaphors. It is on your
hand, so that you see it enacted in all that you do, and on
our forehead, so that others see it in all that you think and
say. Your home and your life in the public square are to be
shaped by it. … [W]e need intentionally to try to live out
the narrative of scripture in our personal and (perhaps
more importantly) our communal lives as a precondition
of engaging in discussion of any issue. (32)
Of course, the only problem is that Deuteronomy 6:5-9 is not
about a story. Ironically, this beautiful text is explaining the only logical
and natural response any Israelite should make upon hearing the words
of the Shema: “Hear, O Israel, yhwh is our God, yhwh alone.” Her
discussion has made the fundamental category mistake of confusing Torahinstruction with Torah-narrative. And the great irony of this portion of the
discussion is that most agree today that the Shema is especially focused on
the first of the Ten Commandments, listed in the previous chapter (Deut.
5:7). This way of explaining how our imagination should be shaped by
the story, according to Keesmaat, is not about a story at all, but about
legal instruction, which ironically, Keesmaat will argue no longer applies
to modern Christians. And perhaps this also subtly critiques the pressing
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of any metaphor too far. Yes, the Old Testament is largely a narrative. Yet
ancient Israelites would likely have found the idea that it can be reduced to
a metanarrative to be reductionistic, especially as this may miss the intent
of “torah,” as we shall see.
When it comes to bringing the biblical drama to culmination
in Jesus, Keesmaat turns to Mark 10:32-45 to illustrate the way biblical
authority has been transformed by Jesus. The story of James’ and John’s
lust for authority – as the Lord’s right- and left-hand commanders – is
worldly authority, using violence and tyranny. But followers of Jesus are
to exercise a servant authority that lays down life for others. This, claims
Keesmaat, is “the way the story comes to its climax” (33).
The problem once again, however, is that Torah has been reduced
to a story, and in this case, conveniently wrapped up in the disciples’ lust
for power. But if we understand “torah” as I believe the Bible itself does
ubiquitously, we would turn more naturally to the Sermon on the Mount.
Here is where we learn specifics of the way Torah-authority is fulfilled in
Jesus. Surely, this is where we learn that Jesus fulfills the Torah rather than
abolishing it, and that not a single stroke of the Torah will pass away until
all is accomplished. Because of Jesus, in fact, it is possible for believers to
exceed the righteousness of the scribes and Pharisees, although it remains
for the rest of the New Testament to explore how this is possible.
Here I hope to have shown simply that there is a difference
between picking up and continuing the unfinished drama of the Bible, on
the one hand, and picking up and continuing the unfinished authority of the
Bible, on the other. Determinacy of authority is the biblical canon itself,
and not simply the church’s ability to discern new revelation from God.
The church is to interpret, and at times it may discern new illumination.
But revelatory authority is determined first by the text, and such authority
is particularly relevant where confirmed by the church’s tradition and
teachings.9
2. The Problem: The Origin of the Conflict Addressed by the Jerusalem Council
Keesmaat next identifies the problem of Acts 15 as one of
conflict in the early church over the conversion of the Gentiles (pages 3436).10 She begins by asserting that the demand for them to be circumcised –
“according to the custom of Moses” – was a way for Pharisaic Christians to
ensure the Gentiles were leaving idolatry behind because it was essentially a
commitment to keep the whole Torah (Acts 15:1 and 5).
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It might generally be objected that the presenting issue for the
Council was whether Gentiles must come to Christianity through Judaism.
More specifically, I suggest here that Keesmaat has rightly identified the legal
aspect of Torah, but not the more general instructional nature of Torah. And
this objection to Keesmaat’s approach brings us immediately to the heart
of the disagreement about the way the Jerusalem Council is being used in
the church today. In a word, it comes down to a common misunderstanding
of the word “torah” (tôrâ). Like the ancient Pharisaic Christians, many
readers of Acts 15 today have unfortunately perpetuated a narrow and
reductionistic understanding of “law” as reflected in the demand itself: “It
is necessary for [the Gentiles] to be circumcised and ordered to keep the
law (ton nomon) of Moses” (Acts 15:1).
It may seem a trite assertion to make here, and one that most
beginning seminarians have learned, but I cannot emphasize enough the
wide semantic field of the word tôrâ in the Old Testament itself. It has
been argued, rightly in my view, that Deuteronomy’s use of tôrâ reflects
the term’s reservoir of numerous semantic variations. As the ideological
“center of the Old Testament,” Deuteronomy’s nuances of tôrâ illustrate
the legal, prophetic, didactic, and sapiential elements of the term, and set a
trajectory of a rich and wide semantic field of meanings for the rest of the
Old Testament.11 Deuteronomy’s unifying use of tôrâ led subsequently to
its use for the Pentateuch itself as Greek ho nomos, famously attested in the
second century BCE in the prologue to Sirach, with its references to “the
Law and the Prophets and the other books.”12
Some have considered the Septuagint (LXX) the point in time
when tôrâ became nomos, a purely nomistic understanding of law, but I am
not of the opinion that this is the Septuagint’s fault.13 In that case, when did
the overwhelmingly positive understanding of tôrâ as didactic, life-giving,
and life-sustaining blessing in the Old Testament come to be reduced to
a codified list of legally binding stipulations or nomos?14 The meaning of
“law” in Second Temple Judaism and the New Testament is an exceedingly
complex topic, far beyond the task I have set for this investigation. It is
enough to say at this point that we must be careful not to place the blame
for this reductionistic nomos at the feet of the halakic tradition of the
Mishnah and Talmud, which traditions were surely only trying to be true
to the tôrâ in the face of Hellenism and the ethnic and political oppression
of the Diaspora.
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At the same time, it must be admitted that it is possible to miss or
minimize the all-encompassing Deuteronomic tôrâ, while taking up instead
the particularizing senses of the Pentateuch’s priestly traditions on the way
to a reductionistic nomos. While we may never be able to trace the transition
in history from didactic tôrâ to nomistic tôrâ, it is clear that in the New
Testament itself, both concepts are present.15 In any case, one cannot speak
of a comprehensive law versus gospel dichotomy in the New Testament
(Matt 5:17) that culminates in a displacement of the didactic tôrâ. Instead,
the New Testament represents the coming of Messiah as inaugurating an era
that renders obsolete any misperceived soteriological benefits of the law. In
this way, the New Testament retrieves the Old Testament’s understanding
that the law is not the means of salvation, but its consequent blessings (just
as Abraham was circumcised after his faith; Romans 4:9-12).
In other words, the tension in the New Testament is not between
its new saving grace and the Old Testament’s tôrâ, but between saving
grace and the statutory and reductionistic appropriations of nomos. And it
is precisely here that I believe Keesmaat and others reading Acts 15 today
have misdiagnosed the problem of Acts 15. She is correct to point out
that the specific legal requirement of circumcision may have been a way
of ensuring that Gentiles would keep “the whole of Torah” (36). But she
has minimized the general instructional nature of tôrâ, by accepting the
soteriological reading of the Judaizers and Pharisees, as stated in the initial
objection that caused the crisis: “Unless you are circumcised according to
the custom of Moses, you cannot be saved” (Acts 15:1).16 They have reduced
Moses to the nomistic traditions of the priestly texts, while missing the
didactic tôrâ of the Old Testament itself. And Peter’s logic, which eventually
won the confidence of the Jerusalem Council, is a direct refutation of their
convictions.
And God, who knows the human heart, testified to
them by giving them the Holy Spirit, just as he did to us;
9
and in cleansing their hearts by faith he has made no
distinction between them and us. 10 Now therefore why
are you putting God to the test by placing on the neck
of the disciples a yoke that neither our ancestors nor we
have been able to bear? 11 On the contrary, we believe that
we will be saved through the grace of the Lord Jesus, just
as they will. (Acts 15:8-11)
8
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The presenting problem before the Council was how to respond
to a nomistic and soteriological understanding of Moses, one that I
believe is not supported by the Old Testament traditions themselves. Peter
transcended the debate by focusing on the definition of salvation itself,
for both Gentiles and Jews (“…we will be saved…, just as they will”). The
Gentiles are not saved by means of keeping the nomos, and furthermore,
neither are we Jews! Peter has rightly placed the didactic tôrâ over against
the constraining nomos, just as the Pentateuch itself sees the tôrâ coming
subsequent to the saving acts of the Ten Plagues, the crossing of the Red
Sea, and the covenant at Sinai. The Gentiles do not need to “keep the nomos
of Moses” (15:1) in order to be saved; rather, they have already been saved,
and the question now is how the tôrâ of Moses relates to them. It would
never have occurred to Peter, Paul and Barnabas, James, or anyone else at
the Jerusalem Council, in my view, to raise the question if the tôrâ of Moses
relates to the Gentiles at all (see below).
Ultimately, then, this distinction between the didactic tôrâ and the
statutory nomos raises the problem of hermeneutical theory. Peter and the
Council essentially concluded, “We Jews don’t keep Torah either, not any
longer.” They had come to understand the tôrâ of Moses in a new and
different way, for a new era, inaugurated by the arrival of Messiah. They
saw a certain continuity with the tôrâ for it was still the word of God for
the new church, while also acknowledging a distinct discontinuity in the
requirement to “keep the law of Moses” as demanded by the Pharisees
(15:1). In other words, this is as simple as the old maxim we use with
students in beginning hermeneutics; the Old Testament law is God’s word
for you, not God’s command to you.17 The Council moved quickly to affirm
the tôrâ of Moses as God’s word for them, as we shall see below.
3. The Process: The Decision-Making Methods of the Jerusalem Council
The specific process of decision-making is next taken up as an
example for today’s church. The implication is that, to be truly biblical,
today’s church will follow a similar procedure in deciding moral and ethical
questions raised by our new cultural context. The assumption here is
analogical: today’s church must decide to include LGBTQ believers in the
church just as the Jerusalem Council decided to include Gentiles.
Keesmaat describes the process generally as one of the “doing
of theology” in which a narration of God’s work in the world, Peter’s
experiences with Cornelius (Acts 10-11), takes center stage.18 Paul and
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Barnabas follow with stories of their own about God’s work among the
Gentiles. Keesmaat finds significance in Paul’s reliance on a narrative of
his experiences among the Gentiles, telling of “all the signs and wonders”
(Acts 15:12), rather than a critical argument against circumcision as we
know Paul was capable of giving (Gal. 5:2-6). Reliance on narrative, on the
telling of the stories of God’s work in the world, becomes a central feature
of doing one’s theology.
Next, Keesmaat observes that James responds to the narratives
of God’s work among the Gentiles by appealing to scripture, specifically
to Amos 9:11-12 (Acts 15:16-17). She finds great significance in the words
introducing the quote from Amos, καὶ τούτῳ συμφωνοῦσιν οἱ λόγοι τῶν
προφητῶν, “and with this the words of the prophets agree” (Acts 15:15,
obscured by the NRSV’s “this agrees with the words of the prophets”).
From this unusual introduction, she concludes, “scripture is seen to agree
with the contemporary working of the Spirit, not the other way around”
(38). In other words, James turns to scripture to confirm the new thing
that God is doing among the Gentiles. She concludes that James “made
the remarkable move of allowing the Old Testament to be illuminated and
interpreted by the narrative of God’s activity in the present” in deciding not
to require circumcision for the Gentile believers. She concludes that, given
the small number of texts in the Bible that appear to condemn same-sex
practices, we might use scripture as James used the book of Amos in order
to draw attention away from those texts, as he drew attention away from
circumcision per se. This will aid us in focusing instead on the experience
of the Holy Spirit in the lives of gays and lesbians in order to produce a new
reading of the scriptures as a whole, as James focused on the experiences
of the Gentile believers. At the Jerusalem Council, the witness of the Holy
Spirit in believers’ experience was confirmed by scriptural witness as the
scripture was reinterpreted in light of that experience (Keesmaat, 39; emphasis
hers).
In response to this theological process for decision-making, I need
first to call attention to Keesmaat’s passing reference to the idea that James
and the Council might have drawn upon “many scriptural texts that could
be used to make a case against admitting the Gentiles.” She notes further
that other Old Testament passages “insist on the need for circumcision
for those Gentiles who want to join the community of Israel” (39). In a
note, she appeals to the instructions for the institution of Passover, where
foreigners or aliens residing with the Israelites are permitted to celebrate
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the Passover only after being circumcised (Exodus 12:43-49) and to the
institution of circumcision in the covenant with Abraham (Gen. 17).19 But
these texts are related to the constitution of national Israel, and none are
related to the prophetic texts detailing the future day when Gentiles will be
gathered into the kingdom of God. Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, Zechariah
and others (and perhaps Jonah as well) foretell the ingathering of Gentiles,
and none of these mention circumcision as a prerequisite to their inclusion
in the kingdom of God. Clearly a case can be made that the leadership
in Jerusalem understood better than the Pharisaic party that the Old
Testament made a clear distinction between (1) foreigners and immigrants
who wished to be identified as Israelites and to join the Israelite ethnic
people of God; as distinct from (2) the future day when all nations would
be drawn to God in faith. This is a possibility not under consideration in
Keesmaat’s treatment.
My central criticism, however, of Keesmaat’s approach has to do
with the hermeneutical principle involved in the “doing of theology” in
this way. On these points, I find an especially close affinity between her
arguments and those of Luke Timothy Johnson, and so I take a brief detour
to address features of his important treatment.20 Johnson focuses especially
on the freedom we have as the children of God to interpret scripture. As
Christians, the scripture has authorized us to exercise certain freedoms of
interpretation. Johnson avers this has two implications for our reading of
the Bible’s condemnations of same-sex practices.
First, Johnson like Keesmaat and others draws attention to the
relative paucity of texts in the Bible condemning same-sex practices.21
In our freedom as interpreters, we should evaluate the number of such
condemnations by comparison with the Bible’s extensive and detailed
condemnation of economic oppression at virtually every level of tradition,
which should leave us with the impression that the Bible’s “off-handed
rejection of homosexuality appears instinctive and relatively unreflective.”22
My response is to suggest that surely the amount of material in the Bible
devoted to economic oppression, among the Old Testament prophets for
example, is commensurate with the recurring and intractable issue caused
by social injustice in their society. This was a concern Israel’s prophets
returned to over and over again, mostly because their audience failed to
grasp the sinful nature of their behaviors in light of the Torah’s instruction.
By contrast, it might be argued that the Torah’s instructions on sexual
behavior were not “unreflective,” as Johnson avers, but were not frequently
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repeated because they were already widely understood, if not universally
obeyed. Furthermore, it might be equally argued that Leviticus 18:22, for
example, is highly reflective of Israel’s context by issuing a call to holiness
of life in contrast to that of the Egyptians behind them or the Canaanites
before them (Lev. 18:2-5 and 24-30). And in comparison to ancient Near
Eastern attitudes to same-sex practices, an excellent case can be made for
Israel’s deep theological reflection in these prohibitions.23
Second, Johnson focuses on our freedom as interpreters to assess
the contexts of the Bible’s proscriptions of homosexuality in light of general
warnings against porneia (any form of sexual immorality), and especially free
to consider “the grounds on which the texts seem to include homosexuality
within porneia, namely that it is ‘against nature,’ an abomination offensive
to God’s created order.”24 He argues that for many, the acceptance of
homosexuality is an acceptance of creation itself, and is not a vice that is
chosen. He asks, “If this conclusion is correct, what is the hermeneutical
implication?” I will argue below that in fact, the Apostolic Decree issued by
the Jerusalem Council warned Gentile believers against porneia, not on the
grounds that it was “against nature,” but ironically enough, on the grounds
of the tôrâ of Moses, specifically Leviticus 18. And so it is not correct that
the condemnation of same-sex practices is rooted in creation alone, but is
also rooted in tôrâ instruction. It should also be observed that Johnson’s
discussion at this point begs the question of essentialism, which assumes
that homosexuality itself is a biological fixity.25
Returning to Keesmaat’s view of the process of decision-making
in Acts 15, we may raise a few additional questions. First, why should today’s
readers of scripture assume we have the freedom to interpret scripture in the
same way as James and the Jerusalem Council? The problem of modeling
our hermeneutical approach after New Testament characters is fraught
with difficulties because they used a distinctive interpretive model from
the first-century, and we are modern and postmodern readers living in the
wake of the Enlightenment. We have entire courses of study and scores of
secondary literature devoted to reading strategies for Christians reading our
Bibles. It strikes me as problematic to propose that we have the freedom,
indeed that we are authorized by the Bible itself, to take freedom and to
interpret the Bible in the same manner that the New Testament authors
interpreted the Old Testament. Simply put, we are not New Testament
authors.
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Second, I think it is also safe to conclude that Peter, Paul and
Barnabas, James, and everyone else at the Jerusalem Council, including the
Pharisaic party, understood that the Gentiles were not eligible to become
members of ancient Israel. The Council itself was not ancient Israel. If ancient
Israel had still existed in the first century as an ethnic and political entity,
perhaps the requirement of circumcision would have been an important
requirement. But the fact is, the Council members understood ancient
Israel no longer existed. The arrival of Messiah had changed everything,
inaugurating a new era of salvation history, a new “dispensation” for lack
of better term that is in fact still ongoing. That new era was identified by
them, as James’ use of Amos 9 shows, as the period of Gentile ingathering,
and therefore their relationship with the tôrâ of Moses has also changed.
Moses has not been superseded or discarded as obsolete, except for the
misconstrued nomistic interpretations, which were really only bastardized
versions of the tôrâ anyway. In the new era, Christians would come finally
to grasp tôrâ as it was intended all along, as useful for teaching, for reproof,
for correction, and for training in righteousness (2 Tim. 3:16).
In sum, the process for decision-making at the Jerusalem Council
did not involve lifting the readers of the text above and/or against the text;
experience did not become a trump card over scripture in Acts 15. We may
speak of freedom in the “doing of theology” that considers meanings of
old texts for new contexts and new situations. But we are not free to make
experience an arbiter over scripture. Our freedom has distinct boundaries,
which hermeneutical principles govern, putting limitations on our freedom.
4. The Parameters: The Conclusion of the Jerusalem Council
Keesmaat turns finally to a consideration of the Council’s
decision, especially as issued in the Apostolic Decree of verses 28-29 (and
compare verse 20). She avers that the issue in this declaration was idolatry,
and especially everything related to idol worship in the Roman Empire, so
that “idolatry was at the heart of the worship that the Gentiles now had to
abandon” (40).
While not requiring circumcision for new Gentile believers, the
apostles decided upon four prohibitions: (1) they could not eat food offered
to idols, or (2) blood, or (3) meat from strangled animals, and (4) they
must abstain from sexual immorality. Of the fourth prohibition, porneia,
Keesmaat says the following.
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[Porneia] had a wide variety of overtones: adultery, sex for
hire, temple prostitution. All of these ways of behaving
betray a sexuality rooted in the idolatrous practices of the
empire, a sexuality characterized by promiscuity, instant
gratification, and consumption. Instead, the Jerusalem
Council called these Gentile believers to a sexuality rooted
in commitment and faithfulness, a sexuality that creates
and builds up community rather than tearing it apart. (Page
41)
While I do not doubt the Council would have agreed with
Keesmaat’s assessment that they were calling for sexual faithfulness, one
wonders if this is all that we can say about the use of porneia in this Apostolic
Decree. New Testament scholarship has expended a good deal of energy
trying to discern how the Council arrived at these four specific prohibitions.26
While there can be no doubt they were concerned about idolatry among the
Gentiles, I have been persuaded by the arguments of Richard Bauckham
that these four prohibitions are based concretely on Leviticus 17-18, and
especially on the recurring phrase “the aliens who reside” (NRSV) among
the ancient Israelites. The apostles appear to have systematically searched
these two chapters of Mosaic tôrâ and found five occurrences of the phrase
(Leviticus 17:8,10,12,13; 18:26). These occurrences explain what nonIsraelite foreigners were obligated to do while living in ancient Israel. And
the four things prohibited in Leviticus are then repeated in the exact order
as listed in the official version of the Apostolic Decree in Acts 15:29.27 If
Bauckham is correct about this association, and I believe he is, then a good
deal more can and should be said about the use of porneia in this text.28
Again, if Bauckham is correct, then it certainly can no longer
be asserted, as it often is in popular and pastoral-theological discussions,
that Acts 15 is an example of the early church placing aside the Mosaic
law in order to be inclusive of new people in the church. Note especially
the substantiation of these four prohibitions in the conclusion of James’
speech. “For in every city, for generations past, Moses has had those who
proclaim him, for he has been read aloud every sabbath in the synagogues”
(Acts 15:21). The substantiating nature of the sentence is marked by the
conjunction γὰρ, “for, since.” James finds support for the prohibitions
of the Decree by observing that the Gentiles are surely aware of Moses,
and perhaps even vaguely aware of the content of Mosaic tôrâ. This is
an appeal to the perfectly reasonable and fair nature of imposing these
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four requirements on the Gentile believers; they would have already been
familiar with these details. Regardless of the extent to which the Gentiles
knew the Mosaic tôrâ, this Apostolic Decree was certainly not placing it
aside or superseding its authority. On the contrary, the Jerusalem Council
was turning to the tôrâ as a definitive and irreplaceable authority, and seeking
in its pages guidance on how it relates to the Gentile believers. Indeed, they
understood Mosaic tôrâ as God’s word for a new day, if not God’s nomos to
be obeyed in every particular. Bauckham’s conclusion is noteworthy.
Acts 15:16-18 establishes that Gentiles do not have to
become Jews in order to belong to the eschatological
people of God, and so authorizes James’ decision
announced in Acts 15:19. The proviso in Acts 15:20
is not an arbitrary qualification of this decision, but
itself follows, with exegetical logic, from Acts 15:1618. If Gentile Christians are the Gentiles to whom the
prophecies conflated in Acts 15:16-18 refer, then they are
also the Gentiles of Jer. 12:16; Zech. 2:11/15 [Eng. 2:11;
Heb 2:15], and therefore the part of the Law of Moses
which applies to them is Leviticus 17-18.29
The apostles sought and found principles in tôrâ for a new formulation of
Christian sexual ethics. Ironically, they were not overturning Mosaic tôrâ but
relying on it for guidance. Again, Bauckham: “Just as the conversion of the
Gentiles has been made known by God in prophecy from long ago (Acts
15:17b-18 = Isa. 45:21), so the laws which apply to them are not novel
inventions, but have been read out in the synagogues in every city from
ancient times” (Acts 15.21).30 It could even be said, based on Acts 15:21,
that the Apostolic Decree shows “the law of Moses continues to be valid
for Jews as Jews and for Gentiles as Gentiles.”31
Thus the specific understanding of porneia in the Decree, and
one to be required of the new Gentile believers, was more than a general
condemnation of idolatry by calling for sexual purity that shuns the
promiscuity of the Roman Empire (Keesmaat). In a concrete way, the
Apostles were relying on the sexual purity laws of Leviticus 18 to articulate
a minimum sexual ethic. In this way, the Apostolic Decree is more relevant
to our debate than merely a means of distancing the Gentiles from
promiscuous Roman practices. The foundation of the new Christian ethic
for Gentiles was, in fact, Mosaic tôrâ.

Bill t. arnolD: lessons oF the Jerusalem council

77

5. Conclusions: The Lessons of the Jerusalem Council
What then can we say about the relevance of the Jerusalem Council
for the church’s contemporary debate over human sexuality? First, we need
to acknowledge that the Old Testament data on human sexuality cannot be
swept away or dismissed as irrelevant to our current debate. Many attempt
to exclude the proscriptions of Lev 18:22 and 20:13 as statutory nomos, and
therefore irrelevant for today’s Christians. But their value as didactic tôrâ
cannot be jettisoned or cut from our canon; these texts mean something,
and our debates must deal with all the biblical data in one way or another. If
it is true that the Apostolic Decree of Acts 15:28-29 was dependent upon
Leviticus 17-18, then the first Christians at the Jerusalem Council relied
on the didactic tôrâ to devise a new Christian sexual ethic for Gentiles. As
Mosaic tôrâ, these data cannot be ignored.
This first conclusion of our investigation relates to the assessment
of Christopher R. Seitz about the last forty years of debate over same-sex
practices. Seitz identifies three separate and distinct phases in the church’s
understanding of scriptural statements on same-sex practices.32 (1) By
reevaluating the exegetical details, scholars argued the texts condemning
same-sex practices had been misunderstood for centuries, concluding they
were condemning rape, pederasty, or cult prostitution. Since the biblical
authors had no context in which to evaluate faithful, same-sex commitment,
these texts were deemed irrelevant for our context. This phase was marked
by confidence that we had finally come to understand the texts, and we were
able now to correct the misreadings of the past. Although one occasionally
still hears such arguments in the popular-level discussions, this approach to
same-sex references in scripture is now largely abandoned in the scholarship,
because it is clearly eisegetical in its assumptions. (2) Next, in light of the
paucity of biblical statements about same-sex practices, it was argued that
scripture offers little to go on, and provides instead a rough guide for
decision-making in the church. The Jerusalem Council’s decision in Acts 15
has played a significant role in this phase. The first-century church in Acts
10-15 in the decision to include Gentiles is said to be analogous to today’s
debates over acceptance of LGBTQ Christians in all aspects of church
life, including the blessing of same-sex marriages, ordination, and what
is usually termed “full inclusion.” My investigation of the hermeneutical
principles used in this approach raises significant challenges to the analogy
as an interpretive model, especially as sufficient to overturn scriptural and
traditional mandate. (3) Finally, in the third phase, some argue the scriptural
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texts prohibiting same-sex practices are clear but irrelevant to our current
debate. The argument is that monogamous, faithful homosexuality, which
Luke Timothy Johnson calls “homosexual holiness,” was simply not known
in antiquity.33 We cannot expect the authors of the Bible to sanction and
bless such relationships or to speak to our world today on this issue because
it was developmentally beyond the range of their religious progression.
Seitz astutely observes that the trajectory of these three phases is
paralleled by a reduction of the church’s scripture to “a book of religious
development, from one Testament to the next,” and ultimately, to our
enlightened modern times.34 The Bible loses all canonical authority in such
an approach, which reduces scripture merely to a resource for thinking
about doctrine and practice. It essentially reduces scripture to an historical
document about God’s revelation in the past instead of an inspired canon
as the foundation for our theological reflection.35
The second conclusion of our analysis raises a question about
the way Keesmaat and others refer to the “process” of decision-making, as
though mimicking a process in the early church is an appropriate model for
today. The method of exegesis used by the authors of the New Testament
is not one we can or should model in our own reading of scripture.36
Similarly, the process of decision-making used in the early church, although
perhaps instructive on a number of levels, is not an authoritative or inspired
model for the church’s decision-making today. The process of exegesis is
not the object of inspiration. But the result of ancient exegesis as written
and preserved in the canon is the object of inspiration. We are not free
to interpret the Bible the way first-century Christians exegeted the Old
Testament. Our freedom in Christ has distinct and liberating elements
for interpreting God’s truth for our world. But we have hermeneutical
boundaries around that freedom, which establish equally distinct limitations
to our freedom when it comes to overturning longstanding scriptural and
traditional precedents.
A possible third conclusion to be explored is the definitive nature
of conciliar decisions. Further investigation and theological reflection is
needed to evaluate the degree to which formal, conciliar decisions made
by the church can be reevaluated or reconsidered by later groups. While
equally difficult decisions were reached by later ecumenical church councils,
especially those of Nicaea (325 AD) and Chalcedon (451 AD), I find little
to validate the idea that subsequent generations of believers were free to
return and reconsider those decisions. Indeed, in these cases it appears
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the saints moved forward without coming back time and time again to
reconsider the question, opening old wounds and challenging the previous
decisions. Perhaps we need an understanding of such church councils
that agrees that once a controversy has been thoroughly debated, all sides
have been heard, and the saints have decided, there comes a time to move
forward in the work of the church.
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